The People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities.
We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. We believe strongly that the further spread of such weapons must be prevented.
We reaffirm the importance of addressing nuclear threats and emphasize the importance of preserving and complying with our bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control agreements and commitments. We remain committed to our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including our Article VI obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
As expected, various samples of fruits, nuts, and other foods revealed very faint traces of cesium-137 when measured with a gamma detector, but even Kaste wasn’t prepared for what happened when he ran the same test with a jar of honey from a North Carolina farmer’s market.
Traces of radioactive fallout from nuclear tests in the 1950s and 1960s can still be found in American honey, new research reveals.
The radioactive isotope identified, cesium-137, falls below levels considered to be harmful – but the amounts measured nonetheless emphasize the lingering persistence of environmental contaminants in the nuclear age, even a half-century after international bomb tests ended.
“There was a period in which we tested hundreds of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere,” lead researcher Jim Kaste, an environmental geochemist at William & Mary university in Williamsburg, Virginia, explained last year in comments about the research.
In October, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) reached the 50 ratifications needed to become international law. Beatrice Fihn and Daniel Högsta look at how European governments can use the TPNW to advance nuclear disarmament.
In arguing against nuclear war, Dr. Tsipis said he came « to believe that reason must prevail. »
A curious boy who gazed at the stars from his mountainside Greek village and wondered how the universe came to be, Kosta Tsipis was only 11 when news arrived that the first atomic weapon had been dropped on Hiroshima, Japan.
“After the bomb went off, I sent away for a book because I wanted to understand it,” he told the Globe in 1987.
That moment set him on a course toward studying nuclear physics and becoming a prominent voice for disarmament during the Cold War arms race.
In what leading campaigners are describing as “a new chapter for nuclear disarmament”, the ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will now come into force on 22 January, after Honduras became the 50th Member State to ratify on Saturday.
Many say that the Cold War didn’t accomplish anything but it did heat up the world of weapon development. The United States and Communist Russia went head to head in the race to develop the most powerful nuclear weapon. However, sometimes the most powerful weapon is not the most efficient one, so the United States took a different approach.
The result was the development of a small, powerful, portable nuclear warhead, the W54. The small nuke earned the nickname “Davey Crockett” was intended for by ground troops and operated via rocket launcher.
“The test seen up top had a yield equivalent of 18 tons of TNT, coming from a warhead that weighed only a little more than 50 pounds. Later, a variant of the warhead saw use in the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, also known as the backpack nuke.”
Autonomous weapons present some unique challenges to regulation. They can’t be observed and quantified in quite the same way as, say, a 1.5-megaton nuclear warhead. Just what constitutes autonomy, and how much of it should be allowed? How do you distinguish an adversary’s remotely piloted drone from one equipped with Terminator software? Unless security analysts can find satisfactory answers to these questions and China, Russia, and the US can decide on mutually agreeable limits, the march of automation will continue. And whichever way the major powers lead, the rest of the world will inevitably follow.
Military scholars warn of a “battlefield singularity,” a point at which humans can no longer keep up with the pace of conflict.
In August of 1953, a British-built Centurion tank drove through the brutal desert terrain of South Australia, its destination a parking spot a few hundred yards from an atomic bomb test. That was just the beginning of this tank’s amazing, and perhaps tragic, operational life.